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The Necessity of the Terrible Good
in the Works of C.S. Lewis and Charles Williams
Kimberly Moore-Jumonville
Spring Arbor University

Created in the image of God,
human beings are entrusted with a self.
“From the very start we are something
that can Be,” remarks Johannes Metz, “a
being who must win selfhood and decide
what it is to be” (3). C.S. Lewis and
Charles Williams both engage readers in
the process of imagining ways we
exercise the freedom of “becom[ing] what
we are;” (Pindar qtd. in Pieper 3) that is,
fully human beings. This exercise of
freedom is fraught with temptations to
rebel against the humanity entrusted to
us, to betray our human dignity and run
away from ourselves in an attempt to
avoid the burden of our lot. Autonomy,
egotism, pride, self-centered control of
others, all dull our spiritual awareness
and help us avoid direct confrontation
with the self.
By depicting characters in their
spiritual adventure of becoming a self,
Lewis and Williams help readers identify
a myriad of ways growth can be evaded.
Until Orual from Lewis’s Till We Have
Faces, and Pauline in Williams’s Descent
into Hell can relinquish their demands for
autonomy in their encounter with the
“lord of terrible aspect,” their spiritual
growth remains obstructed. Until they are
prepared to suffer terror in the face of
goodness and embrace poverty of spirit,
they will not know the reassurance of
love or the joy of submission; they won’t
go on to discover authentic selfhood.
Lewis’s and Williams’s characters’
confrontation with the terrible good

shocks them out of self-absorption like
the transparent ghost in the Great Divorce
hiding in the shadows for fear she will be
exposed. Not until she is frightened out of
her wits by a herd of unicorns thundering
past does she consider anything but
protecting herself (Chaps. 8-9). That
instant of self-forgetfulness can be the
very thing, sometimes the only thing that
stimulates
recognition
of
our
vulnerability, our utter dependence on
God alone. Thus, the wrenching violence
of fear and suffering often become
fundamentally necessary for the work of
becoming what God created us to be.
That God calls his creatures to
suffer terror makes no sense to us. We
can’t believe God would create only to
terrorize the very beings intended to bear
his image. Such a harsh reality forces us
to seek explanation. If the shortest
distance between truth and human
understanding is a story, then a timeless
tale like Red Riding Hood proves
instructive. In order for the child Riding
Hood to be safe, she must both encounter
the wolf who threatens destruction and
discover the joy of the hunter’s rescue.
The fright of the wolf’s desire exposes
Riding Hood’s inability to see, her
innocence and naivete at imagining the
wolf to be benevolent. She emerges from
the episode able to discern between the
appearance of kindness and the reality of
seduction, ready not to mistake
appearance for reality in the same way
again. As Bruno Bettelheim describes it,
2
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the child is reborn to a higher plane; her
exposure to terror teaches her that
overcoming the danger is possible, both
in her newly acquired skills of
discernment and in the possibility of
rescue. Thus, she is transformed by her
encounter (179).
The terrors faced by fairytale
characters require reconstruction of their
understanding of the universe. They must
give up what they expect to happen for
what is; they need a more accurate map of
the territory, a reading of the world that
more accurately matches reality. The
extent to which they can surrender what
they “expect” of the world for what is
marks the extent to which they mature
and survive. What Lewis’s characters in
Narnia must give up when they face the
terrible good is their insistence on the
universe their way, a world in which they
function as the center around which
everything else revolves. Freedom to
choose involves ordering life around a
specific program for happiness that often
becomes destructive in its denial of
reality. To mature and survive, characters
like Lucy, Jill, and Orual in Lewis’s stories
must relinquish their false programs for
happiness based on self-centered and
distorted views of reality. Lucy, for
instance, would prefer a gentle to an
alarming
Aslan
for
his
tender
reassurance. Her question about the lion
Aslan, “Is he—quite safe?” is met with Mr.
Beaver’s answer, “’Course he isn’t safe.
But he’s good” (Lion, Chap. 8). Lucy’s
timidity would not prove equal to the
reality; Aslan must be fierce in order to
protect the children from the White
Witch.
If the terrible good Lucy faces
(before she actually meets him) is the
threat of Aslan’s unpredictable violence,
Jill encounters the terrible good as the
possibility of outright destruction; she
could be eaten. Facing Aslan beside the
stream, Jill admits she is “dying” of thirst.

“Are you thirsty?” said the Lion.
“I’m dying of thirst,” said Jill.
“Then drink,” said the Lion.
“May I—could I—would you mind
going away while I do?” said Jill.
The Lion answered this only by a
look and a very low growl. And as
Jill gazed at its motionless bulk, she
realized that she might as well have
asked the whole mountain to move
aside for her convenience. The
delicious rippling noise of the
stream was driving her nearly
frantic.
“Will you promise not to—do
anything to me, if I do come? Said
Jill.
“I make no promise,” said the Lion.
Jill was so thirsty now that, without
noticing it, she had come a step
nearer.
“Do you eat girls?” she said.
“I have swallowed up girls and
boys, women and men, kings and
emperors, cities and realms,” said
the Lion. It didn’t say this as if it
were boasting, nor as if it were
dory, nor as if it were angry. It just
said it.
“I daren’t come and drink,” said Jill.
“Then you will die of thirst,” said
the Lion.
“Oh dear!” said Jill, coming another
step nearer. “I suppose I must go
and look for another stream then.”
“There is no other stream,” said the
Lion. (Silver Chair Chap. 2)
That no choice other than approaching
this fierce lion, the Christ of this world,
exists for Jill orients her to reality. She
comes face to face, terrible as it is, with
the necessity of making herself vulnerable
to him. Only submission to the threat of
destruction saves her.
Orual, in Lewis’s novel Till We
Have Faces, spends her Queenhood
3
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alienated from the truth of her being, her
spiritual growth obstructed. Indeed, she
takes scandal at the innate poverty of the
human soul in its worship of Ungit. The
radical indigence of the human need for
worship repulses her, because it requires
submission to mystery. What she expects,
human dignity and rational explanation of
the mystery of Ungit, is turned upside
down in the disgusting temple with its
“smell of blood and burning fat” (Pt. 1,
Chap. 1). If the ultimate meaning of Being
is hidden in God, she will have none of it;
she resists Mystery. “Why must Holy
places be dark places?” (Pt. 1, Chap. 21).
She despises the Priest’s recognition that
“Holy Wisdom is not clear and thin like
water but thick and dark like blood” (Pt.
1, Chap. 5). To the darkness of Ungit’s
slaves and the villagers’ fear and
trembling she prefers the bright light of
the Greek’s rationalism, the clarity of
rational assertions, even though they
distort the elusive mystery of Being (“If
the gods had an honest intention to guide
us, why is their guidance not plain” (Pt. 1,
Chap. 12). In this rejection of Mystery, she
distorts
reality
because
without
submitting to the core of Being, the
ground of reality, she cannot draw an
accurate map of the territory. Reality
without Mystery is too limiting to grow
the soul.
The claim made by mystery and
the worship of Ungit is Orual’s stumbling
block. Ironically, she has chosen the light
and brilliance of the Greek’s rationalism
but hidden behind the darkness of the
veil; thus, rejection of Ungit’s mystery
leaves Orual shrouded in darkness.
Hiding behind the veil is a rejection of
mystery. She insists that the God who
requires sacrifice is not a God of love but
a God of the grotesque. Blood sacrifice
means something has to die, a mystery
too much to bear. Psyche’s dying, her
sacrifice to the god in obedience to the
divine will is a terrible good Orual cannot
accept, and in her rejection of that
necessity of dying and sacrifice she rejects

the path to being reborn, the path to
becoming her true self. When Orual can’t
see Psyche’s palace, her “whole heart
leap[s] to shut the door against something
monstrously amiss—not to be endured”
(Pt. 1, Chap. 11). Psyche’s palace images
the reality of the holy and Orual resists
the vision: “I don’t want it. I hate it. Hate
it, hate it, hate it” (Pt. 1, Chap. 11). Soon
she admits she is “building a dam in [her]
soul against belief” . . . “I now determined
I would go always veiled”; . . . “I locked
Orual up” (Pt. 1, Chap. 12). Orual makes
herself the prisoner of her own being.
However, the veil offers no protection
from the truth; it haunts her in the
nameless shape of anxiety. As Johannes
Metz reminds us in Poverty of Spirit,
“anxiety takes the place of scorned
poverty” (28). Preferring the shadow of
the veil to the necessity of sacrifice that
expresses submission and dependence,
Queen Orual becomes the slave of anxiety.
Anxiety haunts Orual in her
longing for Psyche’s love; she blames the
gods for their unjust treatment of her,
driven to isolation, forced to be Queen,
denied beauty and a husband’s love. But
most of all Orual rejects the gods’ demand
that she give up Psyche to the
Shadowbrute’s devouring. This is her
rejection of the terrible good. The Priest’s
suggestion that the “loving and devouring
are all the same thing” (Pt. 1, Chap. 5) is
repugnant to her. Here Orual misses the
opportunity to give herself up and
thereby receive herself back more fully:
“Do the gods flow in and out of us as they
flow in and out of each other?” (Pt. 2,
Chap. 3). Her rejection of the necessity of
submission to the gods in self-denial is
the real source of her trouble; she wants
love without sacrifice. Psyche’s lover
demands full alliance, blind obedience
and trust, all of which Orual jealously
guards. She demands Psyche’s love be all
for her regardless of the people’s need for
blood sacrifice. The Western literary code
regards blood as symbolically transformative, the dying before we die. “The
4
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necessary price of newness,” Richard
Rohr suggests, “is always death to oldness
. . . blood-letting, dying, letting go is
necessary and always painful” (46). The
flowing blood of Ungit makes Orual want
to run. What she misses is that blood
sacrifice images the death of the false self,
the death of illusion exchanged for the
stark reality of Christ’s sacrifice. Orual
can’t receive love because she can’t
submit to the terrible good of sacrifice.
Lewis describes misconceptions
like Orual’s as a failure of the imagination.
For example, we imagine we can pay our
taxes like honest folk paying just enough
to give us plenty left to live on. But Lewis
reorients us to reality: “Let us make up
our minds to it; there will be nothing of
our own left over to live on” (Weight of
Glory 14). God demands everything. Lewis
also borrows George Macdonald’s analogy
to describe the house we imagine God
building in our soul. At first it looks just as
we expect. “But presently he starts
knocking the house about in a way that
hurts abominably and doesn’t seem make
sense. . . You thought you were going to
be made into a decent little cottage: but
he is building a palace. He intends to
come and live in it” (Mere Christianity
174). Orual’s failure to imagine the new
reality God wants to create in her soul
keeps her from seeing Psyche’s palace;
she rejects being reborn to a new reality.
Thus, the suffering necessary for
becoming a beautiful soul stands as a
roadblock on her journey to [true
selfhood.]
Orual’s rejection of sacrifice and
humility is juxtaposed to Psyche’s
complete openness and vulnerability.
Psyche accepts the love of her people as
an image of the soul’s authentic being; her
self-love allows her to live from the
simplicity of integrated wholeness that
welcomes her poverty of spirit. She
accepts the fate of being the daughter of
the king who will never feel the burden of
queenship but whose beauty and
innocence require surrender first to the

people and then to their demand for
sacrifice. Desire for another land, another
reality than her own suggests her lack of
self-centeredness. “The sweetest thing in
all my life,” Psyche tells Orual, “has been
the longing to find the place where all the
beauty comes from” (Pt. 1, Chap. 7).
Psyche’s surrender stands in stark
contrast to Orual’s insistence on her false
view of reality. As a symbol of the soul,
Psyche images the proper response of the
heart: submission to the demand for
sacrifice. Ultimately, this becomes
submission to the devouring God. Such
self-abandonment is not expressed in
purely mystical terms, but in relationship
to bloodthirsty people who expect
concrete, tangible, physically brutal
sacrifice. The path to authenticity and
union with God is not worked out in
abstract terms but through vivid physical
realities such as her relationship to the
people of Glome. Orual withdraws behind
a veil; Psyche exposes herself to sight.
Orual rejects vulnerability; Psyche
surrenders to sacrifice. Orual “shuts the
door” (Pt. 1, Chap. 11); Psyche opens her
hands. Chained to the tree waiting for the
Shadowbrute, she tells Orual, “I was
holding out my hands” to the rain (Pt. 1,
Chap. 10). Her readiness for sacrifice
enables Psyche to become authentic, for
in meeting the devouring god, she
exchanges death for life, sorrow for joy,
fear for peace. In a mutual exchange of
love with the god, she becomes known, an
authentic self discovering that she is
made for god and all her dreams of a gold
and amber house and husband are
fulfilled beyond imagining. She receives
all this on one condition: that she accept
the mystery and not insist on seeing her
lover. This condition is essential. Psyche
has to give up her need for tangible
knowledge: she is not allowed to actually
gaze upon the lover who comes to her.
The key to the soul’s fulfillment lies in
self-abandonment, in relinquishing the
self as the center of the universe. This
obedience is the condition for joy. By
5
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contrast, Orual insists on assessing the
cost of a painful experience; she needs to
gauge ahead of time how much suffering
will be required so she can muster the
resources to master it. But the terrible
good takes her by surprise; it frightens
her out of her profit and loss calculations.
It invites her into new, uncharted
territory where she will have to accept
help.
Not until Bardia’s wife, Ansit,
shows Orual the degree to which she has
projected her false self onto the lives of
those she loves, does Orual recognize the
false map she has created of the real
territory. But even knowing how much
she expended Bardia to meet her needs
does not help her surrender her demands
for Psyche’s love. Not surprisingly, her
determination to become a beautiful soul
fails: “I could mend my soul no more than
my face” (Pt. 2, Chap. 3). Still seeking to
correct her mistakes at the end of her life,
she reads out her case against the gods.
But the last word is silence. Her own
words of complaint condemn her
selfishness. She has not surrendered her
self-absoprtion; the false self’s program
for happiness has denied her poverty of
spirit to the end. Without a face bared to
the gods, naked and vulnerable, admitting
that she can’t solve the enigma of her loss,
Orual has condemned herself. As long as
her desire for union with Psyche remains
a demand for exclusive possession, she
will starve her soul into old age. She ends
a hag forced at the last tribunal to admit
her mistake before the gods, a small
destructive soul untransformed.
Charles Williams’s novel Descent
into Hell recognizes the problem of the
terrible good by emphasizing the quality
of goodness that makes it terrifying.
Pauline asks the poet playwright, “If
things are terrifying, can they be good?”
(Chap. 1). His reply assures her that “our
tremors . . . measure the Omnipotence”
(Chap. 1). The idea of trembling before
God is reminiscent of biblical visitations
of the Holy to mere mortals. Angels

reassure Mary, Joseph, Zachariah, the
women at the tomb, and others not to fear
them; even Saul falls to the ground
(Howard 255). The specific good before
which Pauline trembles presents itself as
an alien figure, a doppelganger, literally, a
“double-goer” that is, a special kind of
ghost which seems to be [her]self dogging
[her] own footsteps (256). Pauline is
taunted by visitations of this figure
resembling her own self whenever she
ventures out alone until she feels
positively haunted. To face this figure
without charging in the other direction is
almost impossible. Of course, Pauline’s
secret, unknown even to herself, is that
she fears to face herself. Obliged without
warning to face an image that is a replica
of her moral being terrifies her as it
would anyone. She fears to confront the
goblin her moral self might, in her worst
fears, resemble (Howard 256). To
encounter the stark reality, the plain truth
of herself, is actually a terrible good,
though she doesn’t recognize it.
Pauline
is
surrounded
by
spiritually dull characters each avoiding
reality themselves: Wentworth, for
instance, whose egocentrism encourages
denial of his slow descent into hell; or Lily
Sammile, the witch-scorceress, Lilith, who
flutters back and forth between the
characters on Battle hill “like a chicken
fluttering round the glass walls of a
snake’s cage (Chap. 4). Lily woos the
others to dissatisfaction, to mistaking
moral choices for opportunities for
pleasure, to preferring illusions of
niceness to hard facts. There is no
mistaking the spiritual context of Battle
Hill as a Golgotha, a place of ultimate
battle between good and evil. What sets
Pauline apart from her friends, however,
is her openness to spiritual realities in
Stanhope’s play, her willingness to accept
help from Stanhope and her grandmother,
and her willingness in turn to aid her
family ancestor who beckons her from the
past. In the end, Pauline’s openness to the
spiritual realm and her humble
6

The Necessity of the Terrible Good · Kimberly Moore-Jumonville

participation in it is what helps her face
the terrible good.
First, Stanhope’s play functions as
a kind of “touchstone” (Howard 253). If
characters understand the play they are
working to present, then we can assume
they have access to the realm where
intellect and soul intersect. If the play
remains opaque to them, they lack
fundamental openness. As it turns out,
Pauline alone recognizes that the Chorus
is key to the playwright’s “effort to shape
in verse a good so alien as to be
terrifying” (Chap. 1). Pauline is willing to
pursue a new and disturbing idea if it is
true. The beauty of art invites clarity,
proportion, harmony and radiance, all
aspects of truth and goodness as well.
Pauline’s openness to the beauty of
Stanhope’s poetry helps her acknowledge
the connection between truth and
goodness, especially the dark truth that
there can be a good so fierce and
demanding
that
it
frightens.
Acknowledging a connection between
beauty, truth, and goodness brings her a
little closer to facing the fear of her
doppelganger. Ruminating on Stanhope’s
phrases “a different life” and “a terrible
good” she wonders if they are related.
Could there be a “good so alien as to be
terrifying. She had never considered good
as a thing of terror, and certainly she had
not supposed a certain thing of terror in
her own life as any possible good” (Chap.
1). Faced with a new idea, Pauline does
not demand understanding or closure;
rather, she is willing to hold in tension
mutually exclusive possibilities that the
good and the terrible could sometimes be
one.
Secondly, Pauline does not ignore
the imminent death of her grandmother,
Margaret, who knows “she will die soon. .
. . This knowledge, terrible to most
people, spurs Margaret to appreciate such
a small thing as the evening. There would
be few more evenings during which she
could watch the departure of day, and the
promise of such rarity gave a greater

happiness to the experience” (Chap. 4).
Her acceptance of death expresses a
properly ordered attachment to life that
can let it go in faith that something better
awaits her beyond the grave. “You can be
at peace,” she reflects, “so long as you
accepted what joys the universe offered
and did not seek to compel the universe
to offer you joys of your own definition”
(Chap. 4). Margaret’s expression of
goodness marks a soul at peace with the
dread of goodness because she is
confident that she won’t be devoured by
it. (Psyche’s description that the loving
and devouring are one would not be
threatening Margaret; to lose ourselves is
to find ourselves. There will be something
on the other side of self-abandonment.)
Thus, Margaret’s submission to her own
terrible good, her approaching death,
enables Pauline to face her fear.
It is not just Margaret’s
knowledge, but her spiritual work that
affects her granddaughter. Margaret can
rest at the premonition of death because
she has exercised her freedom to become
a fully human being. She has not betrayed
the humanity entrusted to her by running
away from her difficulties and trying to
take her own life as the suicide has done
(Metz 24). “When God creates us,”
Johannes Metz suggests,
we are born into the ‘categorical
imperative’ of the Christian faith:
you shall lovingly accept the
humanity entrusted to you! You
shall be obedient to your destiny!
You shall not continually try to
escape it! You shall be true to
yourself! You shall embrace
yourself! Our self-acceptance is the
basis of the Christian creed . . . In
accepting the chalice of our
existence, we show our obedience
to the will of the Creator in heaven;
in rejecting it, we reject God . . . .
Knowing how readily we try to
escape the harsh difficulties of the
human situation, knowing how
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difficult it is for us to bear with
ourselves and how quickly we feel
betrayed by ourselves, knowing
how difficult it is for us not to hate
ourselves, we can then understand
why God had to prescribe self-love
as a virtue and one of the great
commandments, we can then
understand why we constantly
need the help of God’s grace . . .in
becoming human. (Metz 5)

For Margaret Anstruther, self-knowledge
is not a hindrance to facing the terrible
good because she has accepted grace; she
has been humbled in poverty of spirit and
grown in self-love to the degree to which
she affirms adventuring into the next
stage of life with God beyond the grave. In
that spiritual strength she can help
Pauline avoid running away from herself.
Having embraced herself as a spiritual
being having a human experience,
Margaret has chosen love until she can
“see into the life of things” as Wordsworth
puts it in Tintern Abbey. “The girl and the
old woman who lay, both awake in that
house under the midnight sky, were at
different stages of that way” of love (Chap.
4). This particular night Margaret is given
a vision of a man who has committed
suicide in a much earlier time upon the
same Battle Hill where her house is
located. Margaret discerns he is waiting
for help on his spiritual journey and calls
Pauline out to help him. Margaret is able
to extend this offer of help both because
her own spiritual work is done and
“because [the suicide] had never had an
opportunity to choose love, nor
effectively heard the intolerable gospel
proclaimed, he was to be offered it again,
and now as salvation. But the first faint
hints of damnation were permitted to
appear” (Chap. 7). What happens in
Margaret’s room where the dead man is
drawn by the warmth of light and love
and Pauline is summoned takes on
eternal proportions. For Margaret it is a
“last gift of charity”; for Pauline, “a first

exercise in Charity” (Howard 279). In a
spiritually
tangible,
supernatural
exchange, Margaret, in the strength of
Christ the “living stone” (Chap. 7) offers
the dead man participation in the joy that
comes from Christ’s sacrifice and when he
accepts, they hear his moan echoed by the
groan of Christ’s agony. The mystery of
this kind of intercession echoes
Williams’s law of substitution and
exchange, what Margaret has come to
practice and what she illustrates for
Pauline this night. The law inheres, for
Williams, in the nature of human
community: we owe our life to other
people because we cannot eat a meal or
travel to work without depending on the
cooperation and sacrifice of others.
Everyone, all the time, owes his life to
others (Howard 25). From the breakfast
cereal we eat, which depends on the
planting and harvesting of farmers and
the lives of chickens, to the self-giving
love of a spouse who drives us to work, or
the generous neighbor who rescues our
dog from street traffic, we depend on
others. Even eternal salvation we owe to
Christ who laid down his life for us.
Margaret’s work of intercession
with the suicide carries such weight of
glory because it represents a gradual
deepening of spiritual power based on
selfless acts of charity. Pauline is unaware
of her grandmother’s intercession for her,
but she receives it as strength for her own
acceptance of the law of substitution. Her
fear of the doppelganger overwhelms her
for a time, but Stanhope’s offer to carry
her fear as a way of bearing another’s
burden, gives her hope. At first she
resists: “Would I push my burden on to
anybody else?” (Chap. 6). But finally his
answer sets her misgivings to rest:
“If you want to disobey or refuse
the laws that are common to us all,
if you want to live in pride and
division and danger, then you can.
But if you will be part of the best of
us, and live and laugh and be

8
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ashamed with us, then you must be
content to be helped. You must give
your burden up to someone else,
and you must carry someone else’s
burden” (Chap. 6). “When you do,”
Stanhope tells her, “remember that
I am afraid instead of you, and that I
have taken over every kind of
worry.” (Chap. 6)

Standing in Margaret’s room, Pauline
recognizes a face in the window as her
double’s face and moves through tremors
of rage and shame until she remembers
Stanhope’s substitution of himself for her.
Since he carries her fear, she is free of it.
She gazes into her face without dread of
the grotesque, without fear of the
mortality it implies. She sees it exposed as
it is before God and doesn’t flinch. At this
moment, Pauline breaks free of the dread
and faces this apparition “in all freedom
and courage” as herself. Her act of charity
towards herself extends to the dead man
who needs her go out to the crossroads
and point the way back to London.
Margaret’s help for Pauline, won through
her own spiritual work, is intangible;
Stanhope’s is more obvious. But from
them both, Pauline has been encouraged
to open to self-knowledge, to submit her
fear of the doppelganger to another and
be carried forward to freedom in the
divine love.
One more submission to the
divine will awaits her. Its purpose is to
drive home the law of substituted love
that strengthens her for a final ordeal to
come. The love extended to us is always
for the good of others.
Pauline’s ancestor, Struther, she
has discovered in Foxe’s Book of Martyrs
was burned at the stake 350 years earlier.
From her own experience of dread she is
intrigued with his burning. The fact that
she is called to share his burden of fear
across three and half centuries of history
is unusual until we compare the ways we
send out prayers over the space of
continents. Perhaps the Holy Spirit can

span time as well as space. Williams
doesn’t apologize for this idea, but
regards it as a way the fabric of creation is
knit up by love of one soul ‘standing in’
for another soul by bearing someone
else’s burden.
When Pauline envisions Struther
in his cell anticipating his death by fire,
she willingly stands in the desolation of
his fear and asks him to give it over to
her. Because Stanhope had carried her
fear for her, she can substitute herself in
the place of Struther’s fear. At the
moment when she accepts the burden of
his fear of death, she gazes into the face of
her doppelganger. The glory and beauty
of her double gazes back at her without
flinching; in this moment self-knowledge
and self-love in Pauline become one. She
has avoided her apparition out of fear
that it was a grotesque mock-up of her
naked soul. But this was a mistaken
notion; the soul she recognizes now is
actually an image of love and joy. This is
the self God hoped she would become, but
only now in obedience to divine love does
she discover her true self, a self made by
love, in love, and for love. Obedience to
the doctrine of substituted love, a
sacrificial love willing to suffer and
willing to surrender its self-absorption
and self-protection for poverty of spirit,
only this love can know glory. She has
heeded the call, the beckoning of her
ancestor Struther from the depths of time
and opened herself to the exchange of
substituted love. Pauline has borne the
burden of another. That moment her soul
is freed to express its glory of creation.
From the moment of her first deference
and inclination toward Stanhope and his
poetry, to her aunt, and to her ancestor,
Pauline has been learning to surrender
fear of the terrible good, to resist the
abyss of nothingness, to deny fear of
cosmic abandonment.
To confirm this recognition that
joy and glory, not nothingness, await us
beyond the grave, Pauline is called to the
cemetery for one final encounter with
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evil. Adela sends her to the shed in the
graveyard to find the only one who can
heal her sick soul. But Lily (Lilith the
witch) can offer Adela no healing. She
takes this chance encounter, however, to
entice Pauline once again with vague
promises of health, money, good looks,
good luck, peace and contentment or their
substitutes (Chap. 11). Pauline does not
hesitate this time, sure of herself. “Thank
you very much, but I don’t want anything .
. . How could I want anything but what
is?” (Chap.11). She knows the core of
reality, the ground of being himself, and
prefers that substantial reality to flimsy
promises. Risk, sacrifice, surrender, the
law of substitution and exchange are the
only basis for, the only path to love and
joy. Pauline has faced the terrible good to
exchange her false map of the territory
for a true one. Her direct confrontation
with herself has woken her to the glory of
the creature at one with creation that
rings and tells of its creator.
Pauline accepts the necessity of
the terrible good; Orual resists the painful
experiment of living from the outset. She
angrily insists that she has been robbed of
her right to happiness. To the last, Orual
rails against the gods’ arbitrary
governance, unable to accept her lot.
Taken so close to heaven that she can
glimpse the palace made to house Psyche
for an eternity of bliss, she rejects it in
preference for a dingy palace in Glome.
Like the bus travelers taken to the edge of
Heaven in The Great Divorce, Orual turns
back to Hell. She would rather rule in Hell
than submit to a god who demands
complete submission in Heaven. Only one
response remains for God to offer. Lewis
reminds us, “There are only two kinds of
people in the end: those who say to God,
‘Thy will be done,’ and those to whom
God says, ‘Thy will be done” (Chap. 9).
Pauline’s submission to the
exacting will of God is an embrace of the
spiritual adventure. The fact that she
does the spiritual work of facing the
terrible fear adds to her spiritual

strength; as she loves she increases in
stature. Teilhard de Chardin describes
such experiences plainly: “When I
surrender to the embrace of the visible
and tangible universe, I am able to be in
communion with the invisible that
purifies” (50). Pauline’s surrender places
her in “communion with the spirit that
purifies” to the degree that she is
surprised by the beauty of the self-image
pursuing her. She welcomes it with relief
that it is not the shadow of her sinful self,
but the glory of what God intended.
Because she has quite literally submitted
to the invitation to face herself, she has
been transformed. She has welcomed the
spiritual adventure of confronting the
self, welcomed poverty of spirit, and faced
the terrible good to win a new trust that
God will not abandon her no matter what
she faces.
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